Is the Fed being swept out of (monetary) control? by Jeffrey M. Wrase
Is the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
3
Is the Fed Being Swept
Out of (Monetary) Control?
Jeffrey M. Wrase*
What has your bank done for you lately?
One task your bank has probably carried out is
settling checks you’ve written and payments
you’ve made with your debit card. Settling
transactions is an important function of banks.
Most of us would be upset if we received a no-
tice from a bank informing us that it is tempo-
rarily out of funds and must wait before it pays
the recipients of checks we’ve written. How-
ever, we are spared this upset because banks
hold reserves to guard against such events. But
settling payments isn’t the only reason banks
hold reserves: they’re required to do so by law.
For many banks, required reserves have been
larger than what they needed to settle pay-
ments. And because the Federal Reserve can-
not, by law, pay interest on reserves, banks can’t
earn money on them. In response, banks have
set up “sweep accounts”: a bank “sweeps”
funds out of traditional checking accounts,
which are subject to reserve requirements, and
into money market deposit accounts, which are
exempt from reserve requirements.1
*Jeff Wrase is a senior economist in the Research De-
partment of the Philadelphia Fed.
1In this article, the word bank refers to depository insti-
tutions required to hold reserves. These institutions, accord-
ing to the Monetary Control Act of 1980, include commer-
cial banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan asso-
ciations, credit unions, agencies and branches of foreign
banks, and Edge Act corporations.4 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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Although sweep accounts benefit banks by
reducing the amount of non-interest-bearing re-
serves they have to hold, such accounts com-
plicate the Federal Reserve’s job of implement-
ing monetary policy. As sweep accounts reduce
reserves toward the levels needed solely to
settle payments, banks more often scramble to
borrow and lend reserves, also called federal
funds, in response to unforeseen deficiencies
and surpluses.  As a result, the federal funds
rate—the short-term interest rate at which
banks borrow and lend reserves among them-
selves—could become more and more volatile.
In this article, we will consider what effects
sweep accounts have had on the market for
bank reserves and on the Federal Reserve’s job
of managing reserves in the banking system.2
We’ll also look at a recent change the Federal
Reserve has made to prevent interest rate vola-
tility from increasing as use of sweep accounts
continues to spread.
WHAT ARE RESERVES, AND
WHY DO BANKS HOLD THEM?
A bank’s reserve balance is simply an
amount that it holds as cash in its vault or on
deposit at the Federal Reserve. Currently, de-
pository institutions in the United States are
legally required to hold some reserves against
transaction deposits, such as checking ac-
counts.3 Even if they weren’t required to, banks
would still hold some reserves to settle trans-
actions.
For example, your bank uses its account at a
Federal Reserve Bank to transfer funds to other
banks to settle checks you wrote or electronic
transfers you made. It also uses its reserve ac-
count to accept funds from other banks to settle
checks or transfers made to you by others.
When a bank sends payments on behalf of its
customers, the Federal Reserve debits the
bank’s reserve account, and its reserve balance
goes down. When a bank receives payment, the
Fed credits the bank’s reserve account, and its
reserve balance goes up.
Payment inflows and outflows occur
throughout each business day and immediately
show up in banks’ reserve accounts. To ensure a
smoothly functioning payment system, the Fed-
eral Reserve allows banks to have overdrafts in
their reserve accounts during the day, but the
overdrafts are monitored, and these daylight
overdrafts are expected to be repaid in full by the
end of the day.4 The Fed charges a small fee for
daylight overdrafts and a large fee for overdrafts
that persist after the 6:30 pm close of business.5
 Sometimes banks hold excess reserves, re-
serves in amounts above the required mini-
mum. Excess reserves guard against unex-
pected payment outflows that could drain re-
serves below the required level and lead to an
overdraft penalty. But there is a cost to holding
excess reserves: a bank could have earned in-
terest by lending or investing those funds. Simi-
larly, required reserves, which bankers some-
times call idle or sterile balances, cannot be used
to make loans and earn interest. To minimize
the loss of interest, banks have reduced reserves
by improving reserve management and, more
recently, by creating or expanding sweep ac-
counts.
2For a more detailed examination of these issues, see
the article by Cheryl Edwards.
3Reserve requirements have been imposed primarily on
transaction deposits, a practice reflecting earlier attempts
by the Federal Reserve to use reserve requirements to help
target some measure of the money supply. For further dis-
cussion of historic rationales for reserve requirements, see
Joshua Feinman’s article.
4For a discussion of daylight overdrafts, see the article
by Heidi Richards.
5The daily volume of payments sent and received is
large—nearly $2 trillion. Craig Furfine’s article points out
that banks that are active in the payment system typically
send and receive payments whose value is around 30 times
the bank’s overnight reserve balance.Is the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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HOW DOES A SWEEP ACCOUNT WORK?
Most checking deposits held at banks at the
close of a business day are subject to a 10 per-
cent reserve requirement, but money market
deposit accounts have no such requirement.6 A
sweep account takes advantage of this differ-
ence—the bank temporarily transfers funds from
reservable checking deposits into nonreservable
money market deposit accounts.
Consider how a sweep account could work
for you. Your bank would set up two separate
sub-accounts: one would be a checking account
subject to reserve requirements, and the other
would be a money market deposit account
(MMDA) not subject to reserve requirements.
Each month, if your checking
balance exceeded some speci-
fied maximum, your bank
would sweep the excess into
the money market account.
Later, if your checking balance
fell below some preset mini-
mum, your bank would trans-
fer funds from your money
market fund back to your
checking account.7 The bank
benefits because sweep ac-
counts free required reserve
balances, which it can then use to earn interest.
In exchange, the bank may pay you interest or
reduce its fees for bank services.8
As noted earlier, sweep accounts have ex-
panded since 1995. The cumulative amount of
sweeps from the beginning of 1995 through July
1998 has been estimated at nearly $300 billion
(Figure 1). The resulting drop in checking ac-
6Since January 1998, for example,
each bank must meet a reserve re-
quirement of 3 percent applied to net
transaction accounts totaling between
$4.7 and $47.8 million; the 10 percent
rate applies to net transaction ac-
counts above $47.8 million. For a de-
tailed description of reserve require-
ments, see Ann-Marie Meulendyke’s
book.
7Households have only recently
been offered the option of sweep ac-
counts, a financial innovation that
became widespread for business ac-
counts in the mid-1970s. The advent
of enhanced computer technology
and software has enabled banks to
sweep household as well as business
accounts.
8Some programs sweep out balances over weekends;
others regularly sweep out all balances above a predeter-
mined target. Regulations limit the number of automatic
transfers from an MMDA to six per month; therefore, upon
the sixth transfer, all the remaining funds in your MMDA
are swept back into your checking account.
FIGURE 1
Sweeps of Transaction Deposits into MMDAs
Monthly Averages of Initial Amounts
Sweeps of Transaction Deposits into MMDAs
Cumulative Total
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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count balances was partly offset by strong eco-
nomic growth, which increased the need for
transaction balances. On net, checking account
balances declined $174 billion. Required re-
serves fell $16 billion as a result, to around $43
billion, between January 1995 and July 1998
(Figure 2). While the ultimate effects of sweeps
on reserve holdings are uncertain, such pro-
grams could reduce the levels of required re-
serves 50 percent or more from their level in 1994,
according to an estimate made by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.9
Over the past few years, a closely watched
issue has been whether the proliferation of
sweep accounts, and the coincident reductions
in reserves in the banking system, would in-
crease the variability of the federal funds rate.
To examine this issue, we need to consider how
banks respond when confronted with a defi-
ciency or surplus of reserves and how short-
term interest rates are related to banks’ reserve
balances.
THE MARKET FOR RESERVES:
THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET
A bank accumulates reserves from custom-
ers’ cash deposits and payments from other
banks and loses them to customers’ withdraw-
als and payments to other banks. Therefore, a
bank’s reserve level fluctuates.
If outflows push reserves below a desired
level, a bank can acquire more in several ways:
It can issue certificates of deposit; it can sell a
liquid asset, such as a Treasury security; it can
borrow directly from the Federal Reserve at the
Fed’s discount window; or it can borrow re-
serves in the federal funds market.10 If a bank
has excess reserves, it can purchase a liquid as-
set, make a loan to a business or household, or
lend reserves to another bank in the federal
funds market. In the federal funds market, sup-
ply and demand interact to determine the quan-
tity of reserves that banks borrow and lend as
well as the federal funds rate at which they bor-
row and lend.
A bank that ends the day with excess reserves
is less likely to borrow and more likely to lend
in the federal funds market, usually overnight.
A bank that ends up with deficient reserves can
avoid an overnight overdraft penalty by bor-
rowing in the federal funds market. So banks’
daily demands for reserves in the federal funds
market depend on banks’ daily payments ac-
tivity.  Hence, there is a close link between pay-
ments activity, banks’ daily reserve demands,
and daily movements in the federal funds rate.11
FIGURE 2
Required Reserves
10If a bank chooses to borrow at
the Fed’s discount window, it must
post acceptable collateral, such as a
U.S. Treasury security. While the dis-
count rate is typically below the fed-
eral funds rate, thereby providing an
incentive to borrow from the discount
window, discount-window borrow-
ing is to be used only when the bank
cannot reasonably obtain funds from
other sources to compensate for un-
usual and unforeseen reserve losses.
The Fed administers discount lending
in a fashion that discourages banks
from frequently asking for discount-
window loans of reserves.
11For evidence of such a link, see
the article by Craig Furfine.
9See Richard Anderson’s article.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of GovernorsIs the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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If payments activity becomes volatile, so, too, can
banks’ demands for reserves and the federal
funds rate.
In the face of fluctuations in reserve de-
mands, the Federal Reserve plays an important
role by managing the supply of reserves in the
banking system.
HOW DOES THE FED
MANAGE RESERVES?
The Federal Reserve manages the supply of
reserves through the purchase and sale of gov-
ernment securities. When the Fed buys securi-
ties, it increases the supply of reserves; when it
sells securities, the supply of reserves shrinks.
Open Market Operations
The Open Market Desk uses open market operations—the sale and purchase of previously issued
government securities—to exercise monetary control. In general, when the Desk sells securities to a
dealer, the dealer’s payment reduces the amount of reserves in the banking system.  Conversely,
when the Desk purchases securities from a dealer, the Fed pays for them by crediting the reserve
account of the dealer’s bank at a Federal Reserve Bank, which increases the amount of reserves in the
banking system. The Desk engages in two types of transactions to extract or inject reserves: one,
outright purchases and sales of securities and, two, repurchase agreements.
Outright Purchases and Sales
The Desk uses outright purchases and sales to effect long-term changes in the supply of reserves.
Outright purchases and sales are conducted infrequently.
Repurchase Agreements (Repos) and Matched Sale-Purchase (MSP) Transactions
Most influences on the reserve market are short term, so the Desk uses repos to inject reserves into
the banking system on a short-term basis and MSPs to extract reserves temporarily.  “Short term” and
“temporarily” mean one to a few days. Repos and MSPs are the tools the Desk uses most frequently.
Repos. In a repurchase agreement, the Desk purchases securities from dealers who agree to repur-
chase them at a specified price and date. When the Desk purchases the security, it adds reserves to the
banking system. Then, when the repo matures, the initial injection of reserves is reversed. This is a
convenient way for the Desk to deal with short-term changes in reserve-market conditions, since
transaction costs for repos are low.
MSPs. Matched sale-purchase transactions (also known as reverse repos) are used to temporarily
extract reserves from the banking system. In an MSP transaction, the Desk contracts to sell securities
to a dealer and matches that trade with a contract to purchase the securities back from the dealer at a
specified price and date. The Desk’s initial sale of securities reduces the amount of reserves in the
banking system, while its subsequent repurchase returns those reserves to the banking system. MSPs,
like repos, are very short term in nature.
(See Open Market Operations.) The objective is to
engineer a supply of reserves that achieves a fed-
eral funds rate equal or close to a target deter-
mined by the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC). The target for the federal funds rate de-
pends on the state of the economy and, of course,
reflects the Federal Reserve’s policy goals of a
stable price level and maximum sustainable
employment and economic growth.
In practice, staff of the Open Market Desk at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and staff
at the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C.,
generate daily forecasts of reserve demand and
of factors affecting the supply of reserves. On
the basis of the forecasts, the Desk engages in8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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transactions to generate a supply of reserves in-
tended to produce the FOMC’s desired federal
funds rate.12
HAS THE OPEN MARKET DESK
BEEN SWEPT OUT OF CONTROL?
Because they’ve been using sweep accounts
to reduce their required reserves, many banks
now meet their reserve requirements with vault
cash alone. Such banks hold reserve deposits
mostly to settle payments between their cus-
tomers and others rather than to meet reserve
requirements. Because banks’ demand for re-
serves to settle payments varies more than de-
mand for reserves to meet requirements, it has
become harder for the  Desk to forecast reserve
demand, which means the Desk has more dif-
ficulty hitting a specific federal funds rate. In
this respect, the spread of sweep accounts has
much the same effect as would a cut in the 10
percent reserve requirement.
Consider the behavior of the federal funds
rate following reductions in required reserves
at the end of 1990 and again in April 1992 (Fig-
ure 3).13 Beginning in December 1990, and for
the first few months in 1991, the range of the
fed funds rate was very wide. However, such
large swings did not follow the reductions in
reserve requirements in April 1992, perhaps
because banks and the Desk had learned from
the earlier episode how to better manage re-
serves in a system with lower requirements.
Similarly, after the use of sweep accounts ex-
panded in mid 1995, the federal funds rate be-
came more variable, but not much (Figure 3).
Even if the expansion of sweep account pro-
grams adds substantially to the variability of
the federal funds rate, are day-to-day or intra-
day movements in such a short-term interest
rate cause for concern? There are a couple of
12Additional details of the Desk’s activities can be found
in the book by Ann-Marie Meulendyke or Marcia Stigum.
13In December 1990 the Fed eliminated all reserve re-
quirements on savings (time) deposits and on
Eurocurrency liabilities. In April 1992, it lowered the re-
quirement on transaction deposits from 12 percent to 10
percent.
FIGURE 3
Federal Funds Rate: Intraday Range
Monthly Average of Daily High Minus Daily Low
April 1988 - April 1998
Source: Federal Reserve Board of GovernorsIs the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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reasons we might be concerned about increased
variability of very short-term interest rates.
One, it becomes more difficult for the Federal
Reserve to hit its target for the federal funds
rate in an environment with greater variability
in banks’ reserve demands. As a result, the
funds rate will deviate more often from the
Fed’s targeted rate, which may make it more
difficult for market participants to gauge the
course of monetary policy the Fed wants to take.
While the federal funds rate does sometimes
deviate from the FOMC’s target, the Federal
Reserve has not faced great difficulty hitting
its target, on average, in recent years. Nor is
there evidence that sweep accounts have
clouded perceptions about the course of mon-
etary policy. Two, increased variability of short-
term interest rates may be transmitted to long-
term interest rates, and increased variability in
long-term interest rates might cause greater
variability in expenditures by households and
firms in the economy.  However, there is no evi-
dence that more variable short-term interest
rates have led to substantially more variable
long-term rates in recent years. Nonetheless, the
possibility that interest rates might become still
more variable as sweep accounts continued to
spread led the Federal Reserve to examine ways
to reduce potentially deleterious volatility in
the federal funds rate.
WHAT DID THE FED DO
TO KEEP VARIABILITY IN CHECK?
The Federal Reserve had several options to
help reduce day-to-day variability in the fed-
eral funds rate. (See Options for Maintaining
Monetary Control in a World of ShrinkingReserves.)
It chose a simple one: changing the period over
which banks calculate their required reserves.
To explore why the switch in timing reduces
variation in banks’ reserve demand, and
thereby makes the job of monetary control
easier, let’s see how banks calculate required
reserves.
Each bank calculates required reserves on its
average amount of transaction deposits over
two weeks, called the reserve computation pe-
riod.14 To satisfy its reserve requirement, a bank
can use two balances. One balance is the aver-
age level of reserve deposits held at a Federal
Reserve bank during a two-week span called
the reserve maintenance period; the other is the
amount of vault cash the bank held during an
earlier period.15 Averaging over two-week pe-
riods, rather than making banks calculate and
meet reserve requirements each day, helps re-
duce day-to-day volatility in the federal funds
rate.
Prior to July 1998 the two-week reserve
maintenance period was nearly contemporane-
ous with the reserve computation period. The
computation period ended every other Mon-
day; the maintenance period ended two days
later. One problem with this so-called contempo-
raneous reserve accounting method was that banks
didn’t know their reserve requirement for sure
until two days before the end of the reserve main-
tenance period. Banks that found themselves
short of their reserve requirement on the last two
days of the maintenance period scrambled to
obtain reserves in the federal funds market. Be-
cause the Open Market Desk didn’t know, and
couldn’t always forecast, how big banks’ short-
ages of reserves would be, last-minute surges in
the demand for reserves sometimes caused
spikes in the federal funds rate.
Under contemporaneous reserve accounting,
sweep accounts made it even harder for banks,
as well as the Federal Reserve, to accurately es-
14To arrive at a bank’s reserve requirement, the end-of-
day balances of a bank’s transaction accounts for each day
of the computation period are averaged, and this average
daily balance is multiplied by the appropriate required-re-
serve percentage.
15 Technically there are some other balances that count.
Banks are permitted, for example, to carry a surplus or defi-
cit from one maintenance period to the next. The carryover
cannot, however, be bigger than a specified fraction of re-
quired reserves and must be applied in the next mainte-
nance period.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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timate reserve needs as reserve demands increas-
ingly reflected payments activity. The relatively
more volatile payment-related demands for re-
serves began to dominate demands to meet re-
serve requirements. As a result, more unforeseen
changes in banks’ demand for reserves occurred.
Such volatility in demand led to increased vari-
ability of the funds rate as sweep activity contin-
ued.
To reduce the variability of the funds rate,
the Fed switched to lagged reserve accounting.
Two-week reserve computation periods still
Options for Maintaining Monetary Control in a World of
Shrinking Reserves
Under the Federal Reserve’s current operating procedures, monetary control is exercised by tar-
geting a level of the federal funds rate. As we saw in the discussion of the federal funds market in the
text, the federal funds rate is determined by the interaction between the demand for and supply of
reserve deposits. To reduce the volatility of the federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve has many
options. Some options make the demand for reserves less variable; some make the supply of re-
serves more responsive to variations in the demand for reserves.
Making Demand for Reserves Less Variable
One way to make the demand for reserves less variable is to extend reserve requirements to more
accounts. The Federal Reserve’s authority to alter reserves and its ability to impose reserve require-
ments on nonchecking deposits are set out in the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. If reserve requirements are expanded to include more
accounts, moving deposits from one kind of account to another will have less effect on required
reserves, thus making the aggregate demand for reserves more predictable. If predictability of re-
serve demand were the objective, expanding requirements might be a solution. However, expand-
ing reserve requirements would lead to even more idle, non-interest-bearing balances in the bank-
ing system, and banks would undoubtedly also continue to devote resources to coming up with
innovations designed to evade requirements.
A second option would be to eliminate reserve requirements completely, pay interest on any
excess settlement balances, and charge a penalty on deficient ones. In principle, the interest and
penalty payments can be structured to provide incentives for banks to target positive, negative, or
zero settlement balances. The Bank of Canada, for example, provides incentives for zero settlement
balances; hence, on average, Canadian banks should have no idle reserves. This option also removes
incentives to expend resources to evade reserve requirements and leads to a predictable demand for
reserves.
A third option is to keep reserve requirements but pay interest on reserve balances. Paying inter-
est would remove the incentive for banks to evade reserve requirements and thereby lead to a more
stable demand for reserves. But paying interest would also increase the Federal Reserve’s expendi-
tures, and, consequently, the Fed would have a lower surplus to return to the Treasury.  Because of
this, the Treasury has not supported recent or past proposals to pay interest on reserves.
end every second Monday. But effective July 30,
1998, a bank bases its required reserves for a
maintenance period on its average deposits in
the reserve computation period that ended two
weeks plus two days before the maintenance
period begins. Under this regime, banks know
exactly what their reserve requirement is at the
beginning of each maintenance period and how
much of the requirement has already been met
with vault cash. The Open Market Desk also
knows exactly the amount of reserves that must
be held, on average, during each two-week main-Is the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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tenance period. Therefore, the switch to lagged
reserve accounting eliminates one source of un-
certainty about the demand for reserves and con-
sequently should reduce the volatility of the fed-
eral funds rate.16  Lagged reserve accounting will
not eliminate all uncertainty about the demand
for reserves, however, as variations in payment
flows can still cause unpredictable fluctuations
in reserve demand and, hence, in the federal
funds rate.17
Should the federal funds rate prove too vola-
tile in the future, the Federal Reserve could
On July 23, 1997, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan urged Congress to remove the
ban that prohibits the Federal Reserve from paying interest on banks’ reserve balances. The Fed chair-
man also suggested a more fundamental change—eliminating reserve requirements altogether. He
added that “it might well require significant adjustments in the implementation of monetary policy,
including adoption of procedures to control volatility in overnight interest rates that have not been
tested in our financial sector.” If Congress moves to eliminate reserve requirements, statutory author-
ity to pay “explicit interest on the remaining balances held at the Federal Reserve would be especially
useful for monetary policy purposes,” Greenspan said.a
Making the Supply of Reserves More Responsive to Fluctuations in Demand
One option to make the supply of reserves more responsive to variations in demand is more fre-
quent trading by the Open Market Desk each day. Indeed, the Desk does sometimes trade more than
once per day.b If reserves continue to decline, making intraday reserve demands still harder to pre-
dict, the Desk could act more times each day to offset unexpected movements in reserve demands.
However, because the reserve market isn’t very active by afternoon, trades in the latter part of a day
may not be possible for the Fed, since there aren’t many counterparties with whom to trade.
A second option would be for the Federal Reserve to encourage more active use of the discount
window by depository institutions. When reserve-market pressures push the federal funds rate up,
for example, easy access to the discount window could help ease the pressures.  Given the reluctance
of banks to use the discount window, this option would require some adjustments to the window to
encourage greater use.
A third option would also require revisions to the Federal Reserve’s credit facilities. This option,
similar to one employed in many European countries, would combine less administrative restraint
on use of the discount window and a discount rate above the overnight market rates. This so-called
Lombard facility could be useful in dampening upward spikes in the federal funds rate.
a See Greenspan’s remarks in the Congressional hearing on July 23, 1997. Testifying before the Senate Banking
Committee, Treasury Undersecretary John D. Hawke, Jr., agreed that it would be “more fair to banks” if the Fed
were allowed to pay interest on reserves, but that it would cost the Treasury too much and “it’s not a matter of
great urgency.” For further discussion, see the article "Treasury Hits Fed-Backed Plan to Pay Interest on
Reserves" in the March 11, 1998, American Banker.
b Trading more than once a day was facilitated by moving up the Desk’s normal intervention time from 11:30
am to 10:30 am. This change was effective January 1997.
16Before 1968, contemporaneous reserve accounting
was used to calculate reserves. In September 1968, the Fed-
eral Reserve switched to lagged reserve accounting to re-
duce costs and the difficulties banks faced in calculating
requirements and managing reserves. A switch back to con-
temporaneous accounting occurred in September 1982 to
tighten the Federal Reserve’s short-term control over bank
reserves and a measure of the money supply called M1,
a supply that varies with changes in bank reserves.
17For a technical exploration of the link between the vol-
ume of payments in the banking system and the volatility
of the federal funds rate, see the article by Craig Furfine
and the article by James Clouse and Douglas Elmendorf.12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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adopt other policies toward bank reserves (see
Options for Maintaining Monetary Control in a
World of Shrinking Reserves). Two of the options—
paying interest on reserves and doing away with
reserve requirements—would also eliminate the
incentive for banks to use sweep accounts, or
other means, to evade reserve requirements.18
CONCLUSION
Using sweep accounts to conserve on inter-
est-barren reserve balances has reduced reserves
in the banking system. As reserve balances de-
cline, some  participants in the financial market
are concerned about the effects on monetary con-
trol, particularly the effect on the Fed’s ability to
control short-term interest rates.
To dampen the variability of reserve demand
and to avoid potentially higher variation in
short-term interest rates, the Federal Reserve
Board made a simple change: a return to lagged
reserve accounting. This move will make it
easier for banks and the Federal Reserve to es-
timate reserve demands, even in the face of con-
tinued growth of sweep accounts. While sweep-
ing changes in banks’ reserve management may
continue, it appears that the Federal Reserve’s
ability to hit its target for the federal funds rate
will not be swept away.
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